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Abstract: The random walk formalism has applications in many areas, with economy being
one of the most notable examples. In this work, we apply this formalism to a relevant problem
in modern society, such as the access to housing and its prices. A 1-D non-homogeneous random
walk model serves to interpret the collected data from a citizen science public experiment on which
the participants had to rent a house. Half of these games had rules which simulated regulations
limiting the maximum and minimum rent prices, in order to gauge the possible effects of these
policies. Although regulations do not significantly affect the prices paid by the participants, they
foment demand at higher prices and reduced price variability as shown by the root mean square
displacement. Finally, a bubble phase and a declining phase are distinguished, thanks to which the
model of the random walk is extrapolated to larger periods of time beyond the scope of the game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Random walks (RWs) are stochastic processes which
describe the random trajectory of a particle (the walker)
along a succession of steps at discrete intervals of time
[1]. Historically, the study of classical one-dimensional
RWs dates back as far as the 17th century, when Pierre
de Fermat and Blaise Pascal worked on the ‘Gambler’s
Ruin Problem’[1]. The mathematical theory behind RWs
started to develop by Louis Bachelier’s thesis on stock
prices model [2]. As for the many-dimensional RWs,
there were many studies around the same time. Notable
examples include Lord Rayleigh’s theory of sounds [4],
Karl Pearson’s theory of random migration of species [5],
and Albert Einstein’s theory of Brownian motion [6].
As said, RWs provide the framework to model a wide
range of phenomena, with applications on areas as di-
verse as chemistry, biology, psychology or economy, to
name but a few [1]. In particular, non-homogeneous
RWs, where the transition probability depends on time
and/or space, will be studied on the application of a
one-dimensional random walk model on housing prices
based on the data collected from a public participatory
experiment. The data was collected by the research
group OpenSystems from their public experiment ’Jocs
per l’Habitatge’[8]. The experiment was an example of
citizen science, and focused on the problem of housing, an
issue affecting important sectors of the population. It was
conducted in the three different public squares at Fort
Pienc (Barcelona), Granollers and Olesa de Montserrat
and consisted on a game which will be referred to as the
Housing Game.
The Housing Game is a game where its 6 participants
must rent a house within 12 rounds (each round can be
equivalent to one month). The initial price was the of-
ficial price of a 70 m2 house for the location (note that
in the following data analysis all the prices were nor-
malized with respect to the initial price, so that the data
from the three locations could be combined). Each round
each participant must decide whether they want to rent
a house or not. If none want to rent a house, the price
decreases a 5%. However, if one or more players wish to
rent, the fastest player to decide obtains the house and
the price increases by 5%. Once a participant rents a
house, they are out of the game and the game has one
participant less.
Furthermore, we want to test and analyse the effect of
the planned regulations by the Catalan Parliament. To
that end, half of the sessions have extra rules to simu-
late the effect of regulations on the rent price. On the
one hand, an upper threshold is established to prevent
an excessive inflation of the price. On the other hand,
a lower threshold is placed. The idea is to stimulate de-
mand by conceding financial aid to those wishing to rent,
such aid coming from the contribution of the other play-
ers as taxes. If either threshold were to be reached in the
game, then the price would remain the same in the next
round.
We here aim to study the several aspects pertaining
to the RW associated to the game, such as the transi-
tion probability, the probability distribution or the root
mean square displacement, in order to comprehend the
evolution of the price and the demand, and the effect
of regulations. Finally, after simplifying the model, the
asymptotic behaviours with inflation (large demand) and
deflation (low demand) are studied.
II. RESULTS
A. Non-homogeneous RWs
Notation wise, the rounds will be referred to as n,
where n ∈ {0, ..., 12}, where n = 0 would be the starting
point and n = 12 would represent the situation after the
final round. Moreover, an integer k will be used to refer
to the price level, considering k = 0 initially and that
each time the price rises, k increases by a unit (and sim-
ilarly, k decreases by a unit when the price decreases).
In other words, n represents the number of steps taken
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by the walker, while k is a representation of the position.
Additionally, the steps are of a fixed length of one unit
(when the price increases or decreases) or zero (which can
only when regulations are active and one of the thresh-
olds is reached). The probability that rules the movement
of the walker each round is the transition probability or
propagator πn(k
′|k), which is the probability that at the
round n the price goes from k to k′, with k′ being either
k or k ± 1. It is a conditional probability computed as:
πn(k
′|k) = # cases at (n+ 1, k
′) from (n, k)
# cases at (n, k)
(1)
Due to the dependence on n and k of the transition prob-
abilities, the RW is non-homogeneous. The participants
being different each game, the presence of regulations and
the diminishing number of participants as the houses are
rented are factors contributing to said non-homogeneity.
For instance, when considering the games without reg-
ulations, n and k must have the same parity. Another
condition that can be easily found is that −n ≤ k ≤ n.
However, due to the restricted number of participants N ,
a stronger condition on the upper bound can be found.
Since each time the price increases there is one less partic-
ipant, necessarily k ≤ 2N −n. Consequently, the bound-
ary conditions are actually −n ≤ k ≤ min(n, 2N − n).
Note that the straight line k = 2N − n acts as an ab-
sorbing wall which terminates all the games reaching it,
since the N players will each have rented a house.
When considering regulations, the boundary condi-
tions are given by the thresholds. The problem is that
the thresholds are not univocally determined by n, since
they depend on the sum of the times the price increases
and decreases. However, it could be found that the pos-
sible values of k were always among |k| ≤ 3.
With the transition probabilities and the boundary
conditions, the RW of the process can be represented. It
consists of a tree of the possible (n, k) points which are
connected according to the different transitions, colored
based on the probability of said transitions. The results
without and with regulations are shown in Figures 1 and
2, respectively. The most probable paths are also repre-
sented, showing a distinct behaviour, a notable difference
being the fact the with regulations the most probable
path ends a round earlier. This result is consistent with
the average ending rounds of the games: 〈n〉 = 9.9± 0.4
(with regulations) and 〈n〉 = 11.2± 0.2 (without regula-
tions).
B. Root mean square displacement
A relevant parameter of the RW is the root mean
square displacement (RMSD)√
E[k(n)2] , (2)
which provides an idea of the distance to the starting
point. A known result is that the RMSD is proportional


























FIG. 1: RW of the process without regulations. The lines
joining two points are colored according to the value of the
transition probability as shown by the colorbar. Moreover,
the most probable path has been highlighted in red; while the
dashed blue line represents the boundary of the process.


























FIG. 2: RW of the process with regulations. Although for
higher values of n the upper threshold could technically be
k = 3, said value is never reached.
to
√
n when the transition probabilities are independent
on n and are both equal to 1/2 (the RW is unbiased).
Thus, by representing the RMSD in a log-log we can
study the trend. The results are shown in Figure 3. For
n ≤ 2, the RMSD increases steadily with a slope of 0.89,
which is greater than 1/2 and lower than 1, implying that
it is a superdiffusive process. For greater values of n the
dispersion is limited, specially in the case with regula-
tions, where there is a sudden drop of the RMSD when
compared with the values without regulations, implying
a reduced variability in the price levels. Without regula-
tions, the slope between n = 2 and n = 5 is lower than
1/2, meaning it is a subdiffusive process, while for the
subsequent values of n barring the final ones, the slope
is negative. This suggests the distinction of two phases:
a bubble phase (n ≤ 2) and a declining phase (n ≥ 3).
This division will be reinforced in the following section
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when studying the demand.



























FIG. 3: Root mean square displacement for each n, with the
standard error of the mean.
C. Demand
In the context of the game, the demand can be defined
as the number of participants that each round wish to
rent a house. Furthermore, as the demand reflects on
the decisions of all the participants, it is an adequate
way to look into the effect of socio-demographic aspects
such as the gender and the age of the participants.
When studying the general behaviour of the demand,
the cases with regulations, without regulations and the
total cases were considered as well. Figure 4 shows the
distribution of the demand with the price level consider-
ing the total cases. There is a bias towards k > 0, and the
highest demands are reached in k = 0, which is reason-
able due to being the initial level. It was found that with
regulations the demand at larger price levels was higher
than without regulations. For instance, the average de-
mand at k > 0 without regulations is 0.64 ± 0.07 while
with regulations is 0.88 ± 0.08. Thus, it would suggest
that the regulations contribute at increasing the demand
for larger prices.
The relationship between demand and round is shown
by Figure 5 for the total cases. For n ≤ 2 the demand is
greater than 1, which implies that the price will increase.
Thus, it reinforces the idea of a bubble phase. Moreover,
for n ≥ 3, the demand is consistently lower than 1, which
suggests a declining phase when the games also have less
and less participants. Note that within the final rounds in
the second phase, there is a slight increase of demand due
to the game nearing its end and the few remaining players
still needing to rent a house. Furthermore, the average
demand per round can be fitted to a polynomial of degree
4 by the least squares regression. The same behaviour
can be observed when considering the cases with and
without regulations separately, the only difference being
that for most of the second phase the demand is slightly























FIG. 4: Scatter plot of the demand vs the price level k con-
sidering all the cases, with the color of the points related to
their absolute frequency as shown by the colorbar.



























FIG. 5: Average demand versus the round, with a 95% con-
fidence interval. In orange the polynomial fitting of the data
points is represented. The same representation taking into
consideration the gender of the participants is shown as an
inset.
higher with regulations.
On the socio-demographic aspects of demand, the
study was done with the total cases, without distinguish-
ing whether there were regulations or not. Further di-
viding the samples would have resulted in some cases
not having enough data. To account for the differences
in sample sizes, the demand was normalized accordingly.
The results in the case of gender are shown in Figure 5
as an inset. For the first few rounds, women’s demand
is consistently higher, while in the final rounds the trend
is reversed. Regarding the differences among the several
age groups, the most remarkable difference is in the first
rounds where the demand for the youngest age segment
(18-24 years) is the highest by a margin: at n = 0, the
normalized demand for the 18-24 years old is 7.5 ± 1.3,
while the second highest normalized demand at the same
n is a comparatively much lower 4.6±0.7 for the segment
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of 25-34 years.
D. Prices
Another aspect to consider is the probability distribu-
tion of k for each n, p(n, k). Bearing in mind the afore-
mentioned boundary conditions, it can be calculated by:
p(n, k) =
# cases at (n, k)
# total cases at n
(3)
From the propagator, p(n, k) can also be calculated by




πn−1(k|k′)p(n− 1, k′) (4)
Considering the initial condition p(0, k) = δk=0, the
equation can be solved recursively. Although it is sim-
pler to use (3), the Master Equation will be useful in later
sections when the continuous limit is considered.
As for the actual normalized prices paid by the par-
ticipants, it was found that there were no significant dif-
ferences whether there were regulations or not. The 95%
confidence interval for the mean price without regulations
is 1.024± 0.012, while with regulations is 1.020± 0.010,
with the difference not being significant.
There were more significant differences when compar-
ing the rent prices by gender and age group. The re-
sults for the different age groups are shown in Figure 6.
The two oldest age segments have the smallest range of
prices, while the position of the median shows that data
of the first two segments is distributed more symmetri-
cally. The same representation considering the gender
of the participants shows that the range of rent prices
of the women is wider, and the mean price they payed
is higher as well when compared with men’s rent price
(1.033± 0.010 versus 1.005± 0.012).













FIG. 6: Boxplot of the rent price by age. The white lines are
the median while the red squares are the mean values.
III. EXTRAPOLATING THE MODEL
As stated before when studying the RMSD and the
demand, two phases can be considered. The first phase
is for n ≤ 2, where the price level increases steadily as
a superdiffusive process. The second phase is for n ≥ 3,
where the price level is much more likely to decrease.
Consequently, the first phase can be considered as a bub-
ble phase with high demand, with a bubble burst in the
transition from n = 2 to n = 3, and the entire second
phase being a declining phase with low demand. The
objective is to extrapolate both regimes in order to com-
pare them under the same conditions. Thus, the tran-
sition probabilities of both phases are estimated. The
probability that the price increases will be referred to as
p, while q = 1 − p is the probability that the price de-
creases. Another simplification considered is that there
are no boundary conditions due to the number of partic-
ipants N .
When considering games without regulations, the bub-
ble phase can be approximated as a binomial distribu-
tion, while the declining phase can be approximated as
the superposition of three binomial distributions due to
the initial conditions at n = 2. However, when consid-
ering the limit of n tending to infinity by means of Stir-
ling’s approximation, the initial conditions are irrelevant








where µ = p − q and σ2 = pq, being the mean and the
variance respectively for a single step of the RW.
Assuming that the first phase were to be prolonged to
large values of n, the same distribution as in Eq. (5)
is obtained, the difference being the values of p and q.
The results for a given n are shown in Figure 7. As is to
be expected, the bubble phase will dominate for higher
values of k. Moreover, the dispersion is greater in the
declining phase.
An alternative is to solve the Master Equation (4) in
the continuous limit. To that end, one must perform the
change of variables x = kδx, t = nδt, and then expanding










where D = 12δt (δx)
2 is the diffusion constant and v =
(p−q)
δt δx is the drift velocity.
With regulations, the first phase behaves similarly as
without regulations, since for the first few rounds the
thresholds cannot be reached. Therefore, the point of
interest is the second phase in order to study the asymp-
totic effects of the regulations. There are constrained
RW models with absorbing walls and reflective walls [3].
However, the thresholds do not fall into either category,
they act as physical walls that constrain the movement of
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FIG. 7: Probability distribution for n = 20 without regula-
tions for the 1st phase (orange) and the 2nd (blue). The inset
shows the distribution for the second phase with regulations
in the continuous limit for Dt/δx2 = 5.
the walker, but do not terminate the walks upon reaching
them and, unlike reflective walls, the walker may remain
in the same position. A solution would be to consider
reflective walls in the continuum limit and solving Eq.
(6).
To further simplify the model, since p = 0.49 ≈ q =
0.51 for the second phase, the term with v from equation
(6) can be ignored, yielding only a diffusion equation.
By taking the boundaries at k = ±3, in the continuum
x ∈ [−3δx, 3δx]. The reflective walls imply that the prob-
ability flux at the boundaries is zero. Therefore, the fol-
lowing solution with the initial condition p(0, x) = δ(x)

















The research has explored the RW of the Housing
Game, which is non-homogeneous due to participants be-
ing different and the boundary conditions because of the
regulations and the finite number of participants.
The study of the RMSD has shown the relevant effect
of regulations in diminishing the variability of the price
by limiting the range of possible prices. Moreover, the
RMSD suggested the division in a bubble and a declining
phase.
Regarding the demand, its dependence on the rounds
reinforced the aforementioned division of two regimes.
Furthermore, the demand is biased towards positive price
levels, such effect being more prominent with regulations.
The participants of the game were aware of the regula-
tions and therefore, knowing that the price would not in-
crease beyond a certain point, they felt more inclined to
rent a house. Consequently, the games with regulations
finished earlier as well, thus increasing market efficiency.
However, contrary to what would be expected, the
presence of regulations does not affect significantly the
rent price the participants paid. The differences in rent
price are in fact more significant when considering socio-
demographic aspects such as the gender and the age seg-
ment of the participants. For example, women paid more
than men, a result consistent with their demand being
higher in the first rounds during the bubble phase.
Finally, after some simplifications, the model of the
RW has been extrapolated. For both phases the steps of
the RW are considered independent and identically dis-
tributed random variables, and the results without regu-
lations are the expected from the Central Limit Theorem.
Without regulations, in the high demand regime prices
are higher and have lower volatility when compared to the
low demand regime. With regulations the main goal is to
gauge the long-term effects of the thresholds, and there-
fore the second phase is the focus. Due to the boundary
conditions by the regulations, solving the Master Equa-
tion at the continuous limit was the best approach.
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